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LIABILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION
DEFECTS IN RESIDENTIAL REALTY: A
RE-EXAMINATION IN LIGHT OF
KENNEDY v. COLUMBIA LUMBER &
MANUFACTURING CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Liability for construction defects in new homes has been a recur-
ring topic in litigation nationwide in the past ten to twenty years.
South Carolina courts increasingly have had opportunities to develop
this area of law. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.1
represents the latest in a series of modern construction defect cases
dating from Rutledge v. Dodenhoff in 1970.
South Carolina courts have followed a national trend toward con-
sumer protection in sales of new residential realty and have expanded
the remedies available to home purchasers for physical defects. The
culmination of this trend is the recognition of implied warranties that
survive transfer of the deed to the purchaser. Specifically, the implied
warranty of habitability and the implied warranty of workmanlike ser-
vice represent a shift from caveat emptor to caveat venditor; this
places the sale of a home on roughly equal footing with the sale of a
chattel under the Uniform Commercial Code and strict liability princi-
ples.3 This expansion of remedies is shadowed by an increase in the
number of potential defendants in physical-defect suits including lend-
ers and builders not involved in the initial sale.
This trend is not, however, without limits. Courts often distinguish
certain potential defendants and limit liability based on the role each
plays. Aside from the purchaser, the primary actors are the developer,
builder, and lender. This Note reviews the potential liability of these
parties in light of Kennedy.
Prior to Rutledge and its progeny, the purchaser of a defective
home in South Carolina had very few remedies. South Carolina com-
mon law distinguished the sale of chattels from the sale of realty.4 The
1. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
2. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
3. See Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
4. See Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 412, 175 S.E.2d at 795; see also Hubbard & Felix,
Liabilities of Sellers and Lessors of Residential Realty in South Carolina, 40 S.C.L. REv.
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law concerning chattels followed a philosophy that a sound price war-
rants a sound commodity. Thus, caveat venditor, or seller beware, was
the general rule in the sale of personalty. The Uniform Commercial
Code and products liability law have bolstered this principle. In con-
trast, the law concerning realty provided the purchaser with few reme-
dies. Courts did not recognize implied warranties. The doctrines of
merger by deed 5 and privity also worked to limit a purchaser's recov-
ery. In fact, purchasers of completed homes could obtain remedies only
through expressly reserved warranties or for fraud. This philosophy to-
ward realty was based on a determination that "a buyer deserved
whatever he got if he relied on his own inspection of the merchandise
and did not extract an express warranty from the seller."'7 Apparently
this common-law view rarely worked a hardship on the typical home
buyer prior to World War I. Most home buyers purchased an empty lot
and then contracted with an architect and a contractor to design and
build the home. If problems arose, the buyer had the option to recover
against these parties, with whom he was in privity. The doctrine of
caveat emptor, or buyer beware, "applied to the relatively rare
purchase of a new home already built."8
The advent of speculative (spec) housing after World War IP dra-
matically increased the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor
and subsequently led to its downfall. In an attempt to protect home
buyers, courts increasingly rejected limitations on liability and found
implied warranties in the sale of new residential housing.10 The theory
behind this shift is that the sale of a home-whether speculatively or
contractually built-is in essence the sale of a product. Recognizing
this similarity, there is "little reason to apply ancient doctrines of real
property law which are inconsistent with the current and historical
treatment of sales of personalty in this State."'" Courts, in the name of
consumer protection, have therefore replaced caveat emptor with ca-
545, 547 (1989). Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defense-
less?, 35 S.C.L. REv. 469 (1984).
5. See Lane, 267 S.C. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
6. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
7. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 342, 384 S.E.2d 730,
735 (quoting Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 836-37 (1967)).
8. Id.
9. The increased need for new housing after the war spawned a "new breed of
superdeveloper" who built largely on speculation. Id. at 343, 384 S.E.2d at 735. The
"spec" builder purchases a vacant lot from a developer and constructs a home on it. The
completed home is then sold. The builder's risk is that the home will not sell quickly or
will not yield a profit.
10. See infra text accompanying note 67.
11. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 501, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976).
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veat venditor in residential real estate transactions.
In most transactions, a disgruntled buyer is likely to look to the
most visible parties for liability. A disappointed home buyer typically
will look first to the builder or seller. In analyzing the potential liabil-
ity of these parties, this Note will examine builder liability separately
from seller liability. In the event a builder-vendor is judgment-proof,
since many are thinly capitalized and bankruptcy is not uncommon, a
purchaser may look to a lender for liability. This is increasingly the
case with construction lenders.
II. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
A. Builder-Vendor
Because builders and sellers tend to be involved directly in the
sale of a new home, they must be extremely cautious to avoid claims of
fraud and misrepresentation. Potential liability of builders and sellers
for fraud predates the modern purchaser-protection movement.12 In
fact, the cause of action for fraud 3 and misrepresentation has resulted
in liability for a number of sellers in real estate transactions. A few of
these cases demonstrate the importance of the "falsity" and "reliance"
elements in the test.1
4
In Cohen v. Blessing"5 a purchaser sued the vendor, an owner-oc-
cupant, for the sale of a home allegedly infested with insects. The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a demurrer on the fraud count
and recognized that:
[W]hen there exists in the" property which is the subject of a sale la-
tent defects or hidden conditions not discoverable on a reasonable ex-
amination of the property, the seller, if he has knowledge thereof, is
bound to disclose such latent defects or conditions to the buyer, and
12. See Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968).
13. South Carolina courts follow a nine element test for fraud.
These elements are: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4)
the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the repre-
sentation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the
hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the
hearer's consequent and proximate damages.
May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 557, 347 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 1986). The plaintiff
must prove each of these elements by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence. Griggs v.
Griggs, 199 S.C. 295, 301, 19 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1942).
14. For a more complete discussion on the cause of action for fraud and misrepre-
sentation and its elements, see Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 549-60.
15. 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972).
1991]
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his failure to do so may be made the basis of a charge of fraud.' 6
Thus, a party commits actual fraud when he conceals a material fact
within his own knowledge, which it is his duty to disclose. 17 The South
Carolina Supreme Court previously had elaborated on this issue in
Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank.'8 In Lawson the pur-
chaser sued the vendor after learning that the lot he purchased was
unsuitable for building. Unfortunately for the purchaser, this revela-
tion came after he had built a home on the site.' 9 The subsequent set-
tling of the house resulted in the purchaser's successful lawsuit. The
court stated that when a duty of disclosure exists, suppressio veri (sup-
pression of the truth) is as much fraud as is suggestio falsi (suggestion
of falsehood).20
In Pruitt v. Morrow,21 a strikingly similar case, the court expanded
Lawson to include negligent or reckless nondisclosure. The Pruitt
court held that "the doctrine of caveat emptor is also inapplicable in
actions based upon negligent or reckless non-disclosure of land de-
fects. ' 22 In May v. Hopkinson,'23 a case involving the concealment and
nondisclosure of moisture and termite damage, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals found that buyers have a right to rely on the seller to
disclose latent defects of which the seller has knowledge.24 A buyer
cannot rely on the seller's duty to disclose, however, if the buyer has
acted recklessly or has been grossly negligent.
2 5
Fraud is an important source of potential liability for builders and
sellers of new homes. Although the buyer has a duty to reasonably in-
spect the property prior to purchase, the seller must inform the buyer
of latent defects of which the seller is aware. This duty of disclosure is
based on the seller's knowledge that a defect is not discoverable by
reasonable inspection .2 The seller additionally may not make any false
16. Id. at 403, 192 S.E.2d at 205 (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 158
(1968)).
17. See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 436, 23 S.E.2d 372, 376
(1942).
18. 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972).
19, When the home began to settle, the purchaser discovered he had built the
home over a stump-filled gulley capped with clay. Id. at 479-80, 193 S.E.2d at 125.
20. Id. at 485, 193 S.E.2d at 128.
21. 283 S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986).
22. Id. at 301, 342 S.E.2d at 401.
23. 289 S.C. 549, 347 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986).
24. Id. at 557, 347 S.E.2d at 513.
25. J.B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 234-35, 123 S.E. 845, 848 (1924); see Hub-
bard & Felix, supra note 4, at 557-58.
26. See Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 560 n.68. The standard for the legiti-
macy of a buyer's reliance is gross negligence or recklessness. Id. Although presumably a
seller may be held to a standard of good faith or due diligence to discover latent defects,
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representations or conceal any defects. By exercising caution in these
matters, builders and sellers can protect themselves from charges of
fraud.
B. Lender
The principles that apply to builders and sellers may apply to
lenders, especially if they are directly involved in the sale. The Ken-
nedy court stated that "[a] lender should be held responsible if it is
aware of defects but conceals them from an unwitting buyer. '27 Proper
disclosures should be made and lenders should use caution in making
express representations of a property's condition to potential purchas-
ers. Although lender site inspections are typically found to be for the
lender's benefit and not for the buyer,28 Kennedy suggests that a
lender should disclose to the buyer any defects that it discovers.
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Builder-Vendor
The application of negligence principles to builders and vendors
for defects in new, residential housing has yielded unclear and unpre-
dictable results. Although Kennedy arguably clarifies the rule, it is
helpful to discuss prior case law to document the confusion. The pri-
mary focus will be on the builder because the builder is the primary
target in a suit for defective construction.
Rogers v. Scyphers29 concerned a negligence action for personal in-
juries sustained as a result of allegedly defective construction. The
plaintiff, the purchaser's wife, was injured after falling from a defective
attic staircase. The builder, who was also the vendor of the new home,
unsuccessfully moved for demurrer. The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a builder whose defective construction causes personal
injury to the buyer can be liable in tort for negligent failure to discover
or disclose latent defects.3 The duty imposed is one of reasonable dis-
closure.31 The court cited MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.3 and dis-
no South Carolina case law exists on point.
27. 299 S.C. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
28. See infra text accompanying note 52.
29. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
30. Id. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83; see also Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 561.
31. Rogers, 251 S.C. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83. The court adopted the Restatement
rule:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condi-
tion ... which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to
1991]
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missed a privity defense by stating that liability extends to those
foreseeably harmed by the premises.33 The court cited various negli-
gence and implied warranty cases in other jurisdictions3 4 and applied
the same standard of care to a builder as that owed by the manufac-
turer of a chattel.3 5 Thus, the purchaser of a new residential home was
able to rely on the skill of the builder-vendor, at least when personal
injuries were involved.
Beyond this point the law is less settled. The issue, simply stated,
is whether a purchaser can recover in negligence for pure economic loss
not occasioned upon person or other property. This can be made clear
by examining two basic fact patterns.
The first pattern involves a builder-vendor who develops a specu-
lative home that he then sells. Later the first purchaser or a subse-
quent purchaser discovers defective construction. This is the fact pat-
tern of Terlinde v. Neely.36 In Terlinde a subsequent buyer sued the
builder-vendor after the home's foundation began to settle.3 7 The
buyer argued breach of implied warranty and negligent construction.
The court focused on foreseeability rather than privity and found that
the subsequent purchaser could recover under a negligence theory.
The plaintiffs, being a member of the class for which the home was
constructed, are entitled to a duty of care in construction commensu-
rate with industry standards. In light of the fact that the home was
constructed as speculative, the home builder cannot reasonably argue
he envisioned anything but a class of purchasers. By placing this
product into the stream of commerce, the builder owes a duty of care
to those who will use his product, so as to render him accountable for
negligent workmanship. 8
Because the plaintiff's loss was limited to pure economic loss, Terlinde
appears to support recovery for such damages under a negligence
theory.
liability to the vendee and others ... if (a) the vendee does not know or have
reason to know the condition of the risk involved, and (b) the vendor knows or
has reason to know of the condition ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
32. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
33. See Rogers, 251 S.C. at 132-33, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
34. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (builder-
vendor may be held negligent when product is defective and causes injury to a user).
35. Rogers, 251 S.C. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 84.
36. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
37. The builder-vendor had obtained a release from the first purchaser. Additional
settlement occurred, however, after the second purchaser occupied the home. Id. at 396,
271 S.E.2d at 768.
38. Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
[Vol. 42
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In the second situation, the builder contracts with a developer to
build a residence. Later, when the purchaser discovers defects, he sues
the builder, who was not also the seller. Carolina Winds Owners' Asso-
ciation v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc.3 9 illustrates this fact pattern.40 The
Carolina Winds court asserted the economic loss rule to deny the
plaintiff recovery under a negligence cause of action. The rule states
that no tort liability for a product defect exists when the plaintiff can-
not claim injury to the person or property. Without these damages, a
plaintiff must look to contract for a remedy.41 Interestingly, the Caro-
lina Winds court stated that the Terlinde opinion did not suggest that
a builder owes an unlimited duty in negligence for defective or inferior
construction that diminishes the economic value of a house. 42 The
court then summarily distinguished Terlinde because in Terlinde the
builder was also the vendor.
4
1
Reconciling these cases is not easy. While the supreme court
seemed to focus on policy and the court of appeals on technical legal
doctrines, that distinction alone is an insufficient explanation. An at-
torney seeking to advise a builder was faced with difficult and unan-
swered questions. Was a builder exempt from negligence liability if
damages were only of an economic nature, regardless of whether he was
involved in the sale of the house? Did he also have to disassociate him-
self from the sale to be adequately insulated? In spite of the thorough
legal reasoning in Carolina Winds, one was left with no adequate an-
swers to these questions.
Apparently the South Carolina Supreme Court also believed in the
need for clarity. In Kennedy the court addressed Carolina Winds and
rejected certain portions of that opinion. The Kennedy court faced the
issue of whether an implied warranty of habitability arises in the sale
of a new home by a materialman or mere lender seeking to recoup its
losses. Because these facts are not necessary to this particular discus-
sion, they will be reserved until a later time. Suffice it to say that no
implied warranty of habitability arose in the sale by the materialman.
Having decided the issue reserved on appeal, the court turned to a dis-
cussion of Carolina Winds. Although Kennedy examines both the im-
plied warranty and negligence aspects of Carolina Winds, the present
discussion is concerned only with the latter.
The court began by stating:
39. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988) (Carolina Winds was overruled by
Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989)).
40. In Carolina Winds a crack in an exterior facial wall of a condominium building
gave rise to the complaint.
41. Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 82-83, 374 S.E.2d at 902-03.
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While the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Carolina Winds appears to
be a seamless web of proper legal analysis, the opinion reaches a result
which is repugnant to the South Carolina policy of protecting the new
home buyer. The result is that a builder who constructs defective
housing escapes liability while a group of innocent new home purchas-
ers are denied relief because of the imposition of traditional and tech-
nical legal distinctions."
Adding that it would be "intolerable to allow builders to place defec-
tive and inferior construction into the stream of commerce,' 5 the
court expanded prior law to increase the level of consumer protection.
The Kennedy court altered the Carolina Winds framework for
negligence as follows:
The framework we adopt focuses on activity, not consequence. If a
builder performs construction in such a way that he violates a con-
tractual duty only, then his liability is only contractual. If he acts in
such a way as to violate a legal duty, however, his liability is both in
contract and in tort .. . We disagree with Carolina Winds insofar as
it implies that no legal duties are owed a purchaser by a builder to
protect against diminution in the expected value of the building."
Kennedy allows an action in negligence to lie against a builder who has
violated a legal duty, regardless of the damage. A builder, therefore, is
at risk if he violates an applicable building code, deviates from indus-
try standards, or constructs housing "that he knows or should know
will pose serious risks of physical harm.'47 The economic loss rule will
continue to apply only when duties are created solely by contract.'8
These principles apply regardless of whether the builder is also the
vendor.
Although builder liability for negligence appears to have been clar-
ified, it is important to note that the Kennedy court had already ad-
dressed the sole issue on appeal prior to its negligence discussion. Such
dicta in a unanimous opinion, however, should prove a reliable guide to
those concerned with the issue.
B. Lender
Lenders may also find themselves exposed to negligence liability in
new home transactions. In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
44. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 341-42, 384 S.E.2d at 734-35.
45. Id. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
46. Id. at 345-46, 384 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 738.
48. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 737 (the example given by the court is a buyer who con-
tracted for blue paint but instead received brown).
[Vol. 42
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Association4 9 the California Supreme Court held that a construction
lender had a duty to home buyers to exercise reasonable care to protect
them from damages caused by major structural defects. The court con-
ditioned Great Western's liability on its participation in the residential
development. The court pointed to a number of factors that influenced
the decision. First, the land was purchased under a "land warehousing"
arrangement. This arrangement allowed the lender to retain title and
possession rights until the developer was ready to build. Additionally,
the lender received substantial fees for making the construction loans
and for warehousing the land. Great Western in effect had a right of
first refusal to make long-term mortgage loans to purchasers and exer-
cised control over some of the sales and selling prices. Finally, the
court noted the lender's knowledge of the developer's thin capitaliza-
tion and found that the financing "took on ramifications beyond the
domain of the usual money lender."' 0
The wisdom of this decision is debatable. A compelling argument
aired by the dissent is that "the imposition of a duty implies signifi-
cant control over the agency of harm. . . No authority holds that
lender-borrower is the type of relationship contemplating the duty of
control over the conduct of another so as to prevent injury to third
parties."51 Although many purchasers have claimed that a lender's site
inspection imposes a duty on the lender to the purchaser, courts have
been reluctant to hold this. 2 Courts typically respond that supervisory
provisions in a loan agreement exist only for the protection of the
lender.
Apparently the California legislature also disagreed with Great
Western. The California legislature approved legislation specifying the
very limited circumstances in which a lender could be held liable.
53
49. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
50. Id. at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376. For a more thorough examina-
tion of Great Western, see Pfeiler, Construction Lending and Products Liability, 25
Bus. LAw. 1309 (1970).
51. Connor, 69 Cal. 2d at 874, 447 P.2d at 622, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
52. See Henry v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 313 Pa. Super. 128, 459 A.2d 772
(1983)(ordinarily the law does not impose a duty on the mortgagee-lender to inspect the
mortgaged property for the benefit of the mortgagor-borrower); Armetta v. Clevetrust
Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)(a lender owes no duty to others to
supervise the construction and development of prospects it has financed), cert. denied,
366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978). A lender's inspection is not done because of quality control,
but to ensure work has progressed to an extent necessary to release more funds.
53. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434 (West 1969):
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or may be
used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construction, repair,
modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale or lease to
1991]
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This statute restricts the holding of Great Western. It has been inter-
preted to limit lender liability for construction defects to loss or dam-
age that directly or proximately results from the lender's nonlending
activities and from lender misrepresentations.
54
Great Western also appears to be limited by a subsequent Califor-
nia case. In Bradler v. Craig55 an appellate court refused to impose a
legal duty on the construction lender to protect a home buyer from
construction defects. The lender's approval of plans and specifications
for its own protection was irrelevant. The lender was "content to
merely loan money at interest on the security of the property; its su-
pervision was for this limited purpose."56 Thus no per se duty is placed
upon a lender to protect the new home purchaser.
To avoid negligence liability, lenders should refrain from
nonlender behavior. 57 To the extent this phrase is understandable, a
lender presumably can meet its requirements by refusing to exercise
direct control over the construction process. Lenders also should avoid
entering a joint venture relationship with the developer.5" As evidenced
by the preceding cases, a lender may continue to approve plans and
specifications, inspect sites, and engage in other similar behavior
designed to protect its interests, without incurring liability for con-
struction defects. Lenders should avoid actions, however, that exceed
protection of their interests as lenders. Finally, lenders should carefully
screen all developer-borrowers for quality of workmanship and finan-
cial stability.
others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or damage occa-
sioned by any defect in the real or personal property so designed, manufac-
tured, constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for any loss or damage
resulting from the failure of the borrower to use due care in the design, manu-
facture, construction, repair, modification or improvement of such real or per-
sonal property, unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender
outside the scope of the activities of a lender of money or unless the lender has
been a party to misrepresentations with respect to such real or personal
property.
54. See Pfeiler, supra note 50, at 1331.
55. 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
56. Id. at 476, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98. Joint venture relationships with a
developer and "active participation" in a project are examples of nonlender behavior. A
lender will be required to exercise due care in any construction it undertakes.
58. Bradler, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 474, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
[Vol. 42
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A. Caveat Emptor No Longer Applies
Implied warranties in real estate transactions are a fairly recent
phenomenon. Caveat emptor was the standard until the mid-1960's,
whether the sale was of raw land or of land and improvements. 9 Al-
though an early-1930's English court found an implied warranty that a
home must be built in a workmanlike manner and fit for habitation,
60
it was not until the early-1960's that American courts followed suit. In
1964 the Colorado Supreme Court recognized such a warranty in the
sale of newly constructed homes.61 The court held that the implied
warranty doctrine includes agreements between builder-vendors and
purchasers in the sale of new homes completed at the time of con-
tracting.6 2 The erosion of caveat emptor and the rise of caveat
venditor for the sale of new homes in America thus began.
The South Carolina Supreme Court first recognized implied war-
ranties in the sale of new homes in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff.6 3 Rutledge
involved a suit by the purchaser of a new home against the builder-
vendor for damages to the house that resulted from the overflow of a
septic tank. The plaintiff alleged that the design or installation of the
sewage disposal system was defective. The court decided that the doc-
trine of caveat emptor did not apply and held that "in the sale of a
new house by the builder-vendor there is an implied warranty that the
house was built in a reasonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably
suitable for habitation. ' 64 The court explained that such a warranty is
not based on negligence. Due care and fault, therefore, were
irrelevant.65
Rutledge and its progeny explain the origin of, and the policy be-
hind, the new rule. The Rutledge court pointed to "[t]he decided trend
of modern decisions to restrict the application of caveat emptor and to
hold it inapplicable to sales where the vendor is also the builder of a
new structure." 66 This promotes the general policy of consumer protec-
tion in new home sales. Specifically, the primary justifications include:
(1) the focus of the transaction is the sale of a house, not a conveyance
59. See supra text accompanying note 4.
60. See Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931) (such warranties
were implied if the home was purchased in the course of construction).
61. See Carpenter v. Conahoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
62. Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
63. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
64. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 413, 175 S.E.2d at 795; see also Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 570-72.
1991]
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of land; (2) the inequality in bargaining position between the seller and
purchaser; and (3) the need to allow the purchaser to rely on the skill
of the builder.
As for the first reason, the court in Lane v. Trenholm Building
Co.6 7 recognized that the essence of the transaction is the sale of a
house and not a transfer of a parcel of land. The failure to make this
distinction had perpetuated the former rule of caveat emptor. A buyer
was deemed responsible for a thorough and proper inspection of the
premises and could not complain later of defects. By viewing the sale
of a house as the sale of a product, the court recognized this
distinction.""
The court could then treat the sale of a home similarly to the sale
of a chattel, with its attendant U.C.C. and strict liability principles.
The Lane court remarked that "[o]nce the court recognizes the essence
of the transaction is the sale of a product with a clearly defined pro-
posed use, there is little reason to apply ancient doctrines of real prop-
erty law which are inconsistent with the current and historical treat-
ment of sales of personalty in this State."69 The implied warranties
available to new home buyers are consistent with those available to the
purchaser of a defective chattel.
An implied warranty theory supports the second justification by
attempting to compensate for the disparity between the parties to the
transaction. Typically one party is an experienced builder who builds a
number of "spec" houses in a given year. He is familiar with proper
building procedures, applicable codes, and the benefits and disadvan-
tages of certain materials. In contrast, the other party to the transac-
tion is a buyer who likely will purchase only one or two homes in his
lifetime. His expertise obviously is probably limited. The court in Lane
observed this disparity when it stated, "[t]he law should not orphan
the purchaser of a house, who has likely invested his life savings and
executed a 20-, 30-, or 40-year mortgage, by the operation of the doc-
trine of caveat emptor.' '70 The imposition of implied warranties helps
to equalize the positions of the parties in the event the new home is
not as sound as it may initially have appeared. It does no more than
fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties.
7 1
The desire to compensate the purchaser for an inability to inspect
the home for latent defects is closely related to the goal of evening the
67. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
68. Id. at 501, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
69. Id.; see also Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 407, 175 S.E.2d at 792 (caveat emptor does
not apply to the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor).
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bargaining power between the parties. This problem results not only
from the inexperience of the typical buyer, but also from a general dif-
ficulty in discovering latent defects. Rutledge notes that the expense
involved keeps the purchaser from making a knowledgeable inspection.
Therefore, "the prospective purchaser. . . is forced to a large extent to
rely on the skill of the builder."7 2 Such reliance is justifiable because
the builder holds himself out as an expert in the construction of the
home.73 This is the third rationale proffered by the Rutledge court
Under the prior law of caveat emptor, the relying purchaser often had
no remedy. By recognizing implied warranties, contemporary courts
give comfort to the purchaser who later learns that his reliance was
misplaced.
Although Rutledge was fairly explicit in its rationale for establish-
ing implied warranties, it was less clear in defining the warranties that
it established. For example, the court did not specify whether the war-
ranty arose from the contractual relationship or from the sale itself.
Because the builder was involved in the sale, it remained unclear
whether the warranty would arise against a builder disassociated from
the sale. It also was not clear whether traditional legal doctrines like
privity would apply to the warranty. Finally, the Rutledge court did
not expressly address the question of whether it had implied a single
warranty of habitability and workmanlike service, or whether two dis-
tinct implied warranties exist.7 4 These issues appear to be resolved by
subsequent case law.
B. Implied Warranty of Habitability
1. Builder-Vendor
Lane v. Trenholm Building Co. was the first case to address issues
unresolved by Rutledge. 5 In Lane the defendant developer, Trenholm,
sold an undeveloped lot to a builder. A home was then built, which
Trenholm later acquired in satisfaction of a mortgage when the builder
became insolvent. Trenholm sold the home to the plaintiff, who sued
Trenholm after discovering construction defects. 78 The court affirmed a
jury verdict against the developer, and held that the implied warranty
72. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795.
73. Id.; see also Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 397-98, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980)
(buyer entitled to implied warranty despite lack of personal knowledge of the builders,
who held themselves out as experts to prospective buyers).
74. See Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 564.
75. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
76. As in Rutledge, the defect in Lane concerned a septic tank. Id.
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of habitability "springs from the sale itself."" By allowing liability
against a vendor who is not also the builder, the court expanded the
application of this warranty.. It operates regardless of fault. The devel-
oper had not built the home and was in no better position than the
purchaser to inspect for latent defects. The court's holding was based
on the theory that "a sound price warrants a sound commodity.
1 8
Trenholm placed the house in the stream of commerce and exacted a
fair price for it. Its liability is not founded upon fault, but because it
has profited by receiving a fair price and, as between it and an inno-
cent purchaser, the innocent purchaser should be protected from la-
tent defects.70
Because Trenholm had sold the house, it was liable for the defects
under an implied warranty theory.
Terlinde v. Neely8 ° decided another issue unresolved by Rutledge.
The builder in Terlinde was also the vendor. The home began to settle
a few years after the first purchaser moved in. This purchaser was able
to receive a cash settlement from the seller in return for a release. The
home was sold shortly thereafter to a subsequent purchaser, who sued
after additional, substantial settlement occurred. The "spec" home was
three to four years old at this time. The court again appeared to ex-
pand the principle first announced in Rutledge. It dismissed the priv-
ity argument and held that "an implied warranty for latent defects ex-
tends to subsequent home purchasers for a reasonable amount of
time."81
The court stated that the decision is based on "sound legal and
policy considerations, '8 2 and pointed to the builder's expertise and to
the nature of latent defects. Latent defects, by their very nature, typi-
cally do not manifest themselves for a considerable period of time. The
purchaser is required to rely upon the construction expertise of the
builder. "The fact that the subsequent purchaser did not know the
home builder, as did the original purchaser, does not negate the reality
of the 'holding out' of the builder's expertise and reliance which occurs
in the marketplace.
8 3
The remaining implied warranty of habitability cases, all decided
since 1986, illustrate the limits of this implied warranty. The first of
77. Id. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
78. Id. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
79. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
80. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
81. Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
82. Id. at 397-98, 271 S.E.2d at 769.
83. Id. at 398, 271 S.E.2d at 769.
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those cases is Arvai v. Shaw.8 4 In Shaw a builder purchased an unim-
proved lot and then conveyed it to potential home owners after con-
tracting with them to build a home. The homeowners, dissatisfied with
the septic tank system, reconveyed the home to the builder. The house
was then sold to a purchaser, who later conveyed it to the plaintiffs.
The court refused to find an implied warranty of habitability against
the builder.85
Because the warranty springs from the sale, the issue is not
whether the defendant actually builds the house, "but that he places it,
by the initial sale, into the stream of commerce. Holding the custom
builder liable under an implied warranty, where he is not also involved
in the sale of the house, would be incompatible with the law of war-
ranty."' An implied warranty of habitability, therefore, is applied only
against the seller of a new home.
s7
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reiterated this limitation in
Carolina Winds v. Joe Harden Builder."" In Carolina Winds the court
of appeals failed to recognize an implied warranty of habitability
against a builder not involved in the sale. "Since they [builders] were
not parties to the initial sale of the building or the condominium units,
we hold they are not liable to the Owners on an implied warranty aris-
ing from the sale."8 9
The aforementioned cases led to the most recent pronunciation of
the implied warranty of habitability by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.s0 In
Kennedy the court again limited the application of this implied war-
ranty. Like Rutledge v. Dodenhoff and similar cases, Kennedy involved
the sale of a new home. The home was sold not by the builder, but by a
materialman who had participated in construction only to the extent of
supplying materials. In satisfaction of a mechanic's lien, the material-
man took a deed on the substantially completed home in lieu of fore-
closure. The materialman then sold the new home to the plaintiff.
About eight years after the initial sale of the house, the purchaser sued
the materialman because the house had a defective foundation.91
Analogizing the materialman to a lender, the court again refused
84. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
85. Id. at 162-63, 345 S.E.2d at 716.
86. Id. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717 (italics in original). The court found that the
builder did not initially place the home into the stream of commerce.
87. See also Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972) (no implied
warranty of fitness when the owner-occupant of a used home sells it).
88. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988) (overruled by Kennedy).
89. Id. at 80, 374 S.E.2d at 901.
90. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
91. Id. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 732-33.
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to find an implied warranty of habitability. The court held that "a
mere lender, even if a party to the sale, is ordinarily not liable under
an implied warranty of habitability theory. '92 In reaching this decision,
the court compared two cases representing opposing perspectives: Lane
v Trenholm Building Co.93 and Roundtree Villas Association v. 4701
Kings Corp.91 The facts of Lane, discussed earlier, are similar to Ken-
nedy in that the seller was not the builder, but rather one who sold
after taking a deed from the builder in satisfaction of a debt. An im-
portant distinction, particularly in the eyes of the court, is that the
seller in Lane was the subdivision developer. The seller in Kennedy,
conversely, was "merely a materials supplier. '9 5
Roundtree Villas, on the other hand, involved a construction
lender who initially monitored a construction project to protect its loan
investment. The builder deeded the remaining condominium units to a
new selling corporation after he experienced financial problems. The
lender then repaired certain defects to facilitate sales by the seller cor-
poration. Although the court ruled that the lender had to exercise due
care in regard to the repair work it undertook, it held that the lender
was not a party to any sales sufficient to establish liability under an
implied warranty of habitability."' The Kennedy holding extends this
protection to most lenders, even if they are minimally involved in the
sale.
The Kennedy court distinguished Lane and expanded the princi-
ples of Roundtree Villas to insulate the materialman from implied
warranty liability. The holding raises some interesting questions. For
example, why was the materialman in Kennedy a "mere lender" and
the developer in Lane the source of an implied warranty?
Although the court found that the materialman sold the home
only because he took a deed in lieu of foreclosure, both parties sold the
houses in an attempt to recoup their losses. The court also stated that
"[t]o have held against the buyer [in Lane] would have been to frus-
trate his reasonable expectations when he entered the transaction." '9
Certainly the reasonable expectations of the buyer in Kennedy also
were frustrated when he discovered the defective foundation. Further-
more, neither defendant actually built the homes involved; one fur-
nished materials and the other furnished the lot. However, the court's
distinction is evident in this last characterization. A developer typically
92. Id. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
93. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
94. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
95. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 339, 384 S.E.2d at 733.
96. See Roundtree Villas, 282 S.C. at 423, 321 S.E.2d at 50-51.
97. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 339, 384 S.E.2d at 733.
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does more than merely furnish the lot. He customarily is deeply in-
volved in the process, from purchasing land to establishing a plat for
the subdivision."" The developer arguably can be viewed as more than
a mere lender. Unfortunately, the court chose not to elaborate on this
issue but instead summarily distinguished the parties.
This distinction leads, predictably, to a final important question:
Why is a mere lender insulated from implied warranty liability when
the developer is not? The Kennedy court answered this question by
stating:
The public policy reasons for refusing to impose warranty liability are
myriad. To require every lender to foreclose in order to shield itself
from liability instead of taking a deed in lieu would be unduly bur-
densome on the state's judicial and administrative machinery. The
imposition of warranty liability on all lenders/sellers would discourage
lending, and thus, economic growth. Further, it is unduly punitive to
impose potential warranty liability on a lender that is searching for
some way to recover the losses it has suffered due to the default of the
debtor.9
The parameters of the implied warranty of habitability thus have
been further defined by Kennedy. Although the sale of a new home
generally will continue to give rise to the warranty, the presence of a
mere lender in the sale will limit its application. Builder-vendors,
therefore, need to be aware of this potential liability.
2. Lender
Lenders can avoid liability so long as they remain "mere lenders"
in post-default sales. However, certain actions will take a lender out of
this safe harbor. Kennedy provides examples of behavior that may re-
sult in liability. Lenders must avoid three main traps. First, a lender
may be liable under an implied warranty if it develops the home or "is
so amalgamated with the developer or builder so as to blur its legal
distinction." 00 A finding that the lender and a builder-developer en-
tered into a joint venture will trigger this exception. Such a finding
hinges on the intent of the parties.
98. The developer typically takes a second mortgage on the property he sells to the
builder. The lender, on the other hand, takes the first mortgage as security for a con-
struction loan. The developer, therefore, is dependent on the sale of the completed home
to realize any benefit from his bargain.
99. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734. Although a few remarks about
this policy decision will be made in the section on lender liability, a thorough policy
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It [a joint venture] must arise from a contractual basis, although the
contract need not be express but may be implied. . . . To constitute
a joint venture, certain facts are essential: (1) each party . . . must
make a contribution . . . ; (2) profits must be shared . . . ; (3) there
must be a 'joint proprietary interest and right of mutual control over
the subject matter' of the enterprise; [and] (4) usually, there is a sin-
gle business transaction rather than a general and continuous
transaction." 1
Second, avoiding a joint venture may not necessarily suffice to pro-
tect a lender. Alender may also be liable for "active participation" in a
home construction project. The premier example of this situation is
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association,' which is dis-
cussed in the negligence section.103 As previously noted, subsequent
case law has tended to limit this liability to lenders whose activities
greatly exceed those of a typical lender.
1 0
4
The final exception typically occurs when a lender gains title to a
project after a default and completes construction prior to sale. Round-
tree Villas Association v. 4701 Kings Corp. recognized a lender's duty
to use due care in the construction it undertakes. 0 5 The potential for
liability increases correspondingly with a lender's involvement in the
marketing and sale of such projects. A Florida appeals court stated the
test in that state as follows:
A lender who forecloses a mortgage on a construction project and be-
comes the developer of that project is liable to a purchaser of a unit of
the project for (a) performance of express representations made to the
purchaser by the lender, (b) patent construction defects in the entire
project, and (c) breach of any applicable warranties resulting from de-
fects in the portions of the project completed by the lender. 10
As a whole, these exceptions do not appear to impose unreasona-
ble restrictions on the typical lender's behavior. By acting as a mere
lender-one "content to merely loan money at interest on the security
of property"' 0 7 -most construction lenders should avoid liability under
101. Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 226 Pa. Super. 157, 161-62, 313 A.2d 249, 250-51
(1973); see also Central Bank, N.A. v. Baldwin, 94 Nev. 581, 583 P.2d 1087 (1978) (joint
venture in which a bank lent money and its subsidiary owned half the stock of the
developer).
102. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
103. See supra text accompanying note 49.
104. See Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); Allison v.
Home Say. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
105. Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
106. Port Sewall Harbor and Tennis Club Owners Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 463 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
107. Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 476, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401, 408 (1969).
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implied warranty theories.10 8
C. Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Service
1. Builder-Vendor
As noted in the introduction to this section, the Rutledge court
left open the issue of whether it established one or two implied warran-
ties. The court simply held that "in the sale of a new house by the
builder-vendor there is an implied warranty that the house was built in
a reasonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably suitable for
habitation."'10 9 Because South Carolina courts did not decide this issue
until Kennedy, it may be helpful first to examine the triatment of this
implied warranty in other jurisdictions.
Not surprisingly, courts in other jurisdictions introduced the prin-
ciple of caveat venditor in new home sales in language similar to that
of Rutledge. In Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc."10 the
South Dakota Supreme Court held that "where in the sale of a new
house the vendor is also a builder of houses for sale there is an implied
warranty of reasonable workmanship and habitability surviving the de-
livery of deed."'' Whereas South Carolina implied warranty law devel-
oped around a warranty of habitability, other jurisdictions developed a
separate warranty of workmanlike service. The Waggoner court ad-
dressed this warranty in a construction defect case and remarked: "As
a general rule, it may be said that where a person holds himself out as
especially qualified to perform work of a particular character there is
an implied warranty that the work shall be done in a reasonably good
and workmanlike manner."'
12
Although courts began to speak in terms of an implied warranty of
workmanlike service, it remained unclear whether this warranty had an
existence separate and distinct from the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity theory. Courts continued to treat the warranties as Siamese twins;
each recognized, but having a singular existence. Opinions continued to
speak of the two concepts, yet decisions were typically based on the
implied warranty theory.
108. See discussion on implied warranty of workmanlike service, infra notes 109-24
and accompanying text.
109. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970).
110. 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
111. Id. at 68, 154 N.W.2d at 809; see also Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388
P.2d 399 (1964) (built in a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation); Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (reasonable workmanship and habitability).
112. Waggoner, 83 S.D. at 64, 154 N.W.2d at 807; see generally 17 Ahl. JUR. 2D Con-
tracts § 371 (1964 & Supp. 1990).
1991]
19
Webb: Liability for Construction Defects in Residential Realty: A Re-ex
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Finally in 1985, the Texas Supreme Court directly addressed this
issue. In Evans v. J. Stiles, Inc.113 disgruntled home owners sued under
both theories, alleging the use of faulty brick on the home. A jury
found that the home was not constructed in a good and workmanlike
manner, but refused to find it uninhabitable. The court held that the
implied warranty of construction in a good workmanlike manner is in-
dependent of the implied warranty of habitability."4
The development of separate implied warranty theories has
proved cumbersome in South Carolina. Prior to Kennedy, courts
tended to recognize only a general implied warranty theory, typically
with an emphasis on the concept of habitability. One explanation for
this history may be a lack of appellate cases with facts similar to those
in Evans-a habitable home with unworkmanlike construction.
Interestingly, the origin of an implied warranty of workmanlike
service in South Carolina predates the Rutledge opinion by nineteen
years. In Hill v. Polar Pantries'5 the court found that "where 'a per-
son holds himself out as specially qualified to perform work of a partic-
ular character, there is an implied warranty that the work which he
undertakes shall be of proper workmanship . .. ."'I" Polar Pantries
involved the planning and installation of a frozen-food-locker plant.
The defendant, owner of similar plants, contracted to design and over-
see the installation of plaintiff's plant. Subsequent cracking of the
floors and walls gave rise to the suit.
Aside from Rutledge, South Carolina courts did not discuss this
theory of implied warranty again until Carolina Winds Owners' Asso-
ciation v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc."7 In Carolina Winds the court of
appeals rejected the plaintiff's implied warranty of habitability and
negligence causes of action against the builder and noted other poten-
tial remedies. Citing Polar Pantries, the court stated that builder con-
tracts contain an implied warranty that the work will be performed in
a careful, diligent, workmanlike manner. The court continued:
If the construction turns out to be defective by reason of the builder's
unworkmanlike performance, the breach of warranty gives the injured
party, i.e., the person who contracted to have construction work done,
a claim for damages for loss of his expectancy. This is a liability aris-
ing from the construction contract to which the builder is a party, not
some subsequent contract of sale to which he is a stranger." 8
113. 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985).
114. Id. at 400.
115, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
116. Id. at 271, 64 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 329 (1963)).
117. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988).
118. Id. at 84, 374 S.E.2d at 903.
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Although it limited the concept by the doctrine of privity, this court
apparently recognized a separate, implied warranty of workmanlike
service. However, this warranty would only benefit a new home pur-
chaser who contracted directly with the builder. An implied warranty
of habitability is therefore the only warranty available to the majority
of new home purchasers.
This privity limitation apparently led the Kennedy court to ad-
dress the issue. "The practical difficulties facing today's new home
buyer mandate that we allow a buyer to ordinarily proceed against
both the builder and seller, or either of them."119 Similar to its han-
dling of the negligence issue, the court expanded the implied warranty
principles to afford new home purchasers greater protection. Although
this portion of the opinion is dicta, the court's unanimity greatly in-
creases the opinion's usefulness as a guide.
Referring to Carolina Winds, the Kennedy court stated that work-
manlike performance is an "implied warranty of workmanlike service,
and is distinct from the implied warranty of habitability.' 120 The court
then rejected any requirement of privity and overruled Carolina Winds
to the extent that it recognized such a requirement. Finally, the court
held that "[a]n implied warranty of service attaches to a builder's con-
struction of new residential housing. A home buyer purchasing from a
party not the builder may ordinarily sue the builder on this warranty
despite the lack of contractual privity." 21
Although courts have begun to recognize a separate warranty of
service, few have elaborated on its character. One court described
workmanlike as that "quality of work performed by one who has the
knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice
of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally consid-
ered proficient by those capable of judging such work.' 22 This lan-
guage indicates that a warranty of service is in some respects similar to
the requirement of reasonable care under negligence theory.123 The
standard, therefore, appears to be one not of perfection, but of
reasonableness.
124
119. 299 S.C. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
122. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987).
123. Id.; see also Hubbard & Felix, supra note 4, at 569; 17 Aml. JuR. 2D Contracts §
372 (1964 & Supp. 1990).
124. See Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 41, 470
P.2d 593, 598 (1970) (standard of workmen of average skill and intelligence).
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2. Lender
The application to builders of the warranty of workmanlike con-
struction is apparent. A less obvious possibility to consider, however, is
its effect on lenders. The application of this warranty to repairmen and
other service providers supports this possibility.2 5 Although at least
one court has rejected the application of this warranty to professionals,
that opinion is suspect in light of Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v.
Barnes."' Lenders should at least be aware of this implied warranty
and the potential for liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the continuing trend toward caveat venditor, builders,
vendors, and lenders should be increasingly cautious in transactions
concerning the sale of new homes. The implied warranties of habitabil-
ity and workmanlike service pose the greatest potential for liability.
Although the implied warranty of habitability theory is well defined,
the concept of the implied warranty of workmanlike service is still in
the formative stage.
Kennedy insulates "mere lenders" from most liability, while si-
multaneously exposing builder-vendors to greater liability. Conse-
quently, these parties no longer can rely on legal doctrines such as
privity and the economic loss rule for protection. The Kennedy deci-
sion clarifies the law of liability for construction defects in South Caro-
lina and provides a timely warning to those involved in the construc-
tion of new homes in South Carolina.
Richard C. Webb
125. See Melody Home Mfg. Co., 741 S.W.2d at 349. But see Arvida Corp. v. A.J.
Indus., Inc., 370 So. 2d 809 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (implied warranties are limited to
sales of goods).
126. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). Compare Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.
1985) (implied warranty unnecessary for psychiatrist services) with Melody Home Mfg.
Co., 741 S.W.2d at 349 (drafter of Melody joined in dissenting opinion in Dennis).
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